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Ladies and gentlemen,  
First I would like to thank you for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to share my 
views on this important topic of “migration, refugee crises and terrorism as challenges for 
intercultural and interreligious dialogue” with you. 
I feel a bit the odd man though: the programme refers to “The views of the UNESCO Chairs 
from SEE”. However, I am not a UNESCO-chair, neither am I from this region. I am from 
Belgium: Brussels may be considered the “capital” of the EU, but a quick glance at the map 
shows it is not exactly situated in the middle of the continent but at the outer Western edge 
(only British Isles are more to the west, but they are “islands”, “in but not of” Europe as 
Winston Churchill once observed and as the recent Brexit demonstrated once again. And on 
top of that, as you already could guess from the last quote, I am a historian, so I will also 
speak of the past, not just because that is what historians do, but because it is highly relevant. 
As a historian I am well aware of the long tradition of Western Europeans to lecture 
everybody to the east of the Berlin – Vienna axis and that includes the rest of Europe:  
The cultural historian Larry Wolff once wrote a book on the subject called Inventing Eastern 
Europe in which he showed how late Enlightenment intellectuals created a dichotomy 
between a presumed “enlightened” western Europe and a ‘backward’ Eastern Europe. To be 
sure these days are over: actually I believe that we in Western Europe can learn from you, as 
this region has a much longer history of religious diversity and living together. 
The reference to the Enlightenment is relevant though, in more ways than one, as it is 
often invoked in discussions about contemporary migrants and asylum seekers. They too are 
depicted as less “enlightened” and not sharing the same values as we do. In this respect people 
refer to the separation between church and state, but also to gender equality and consumer 
culture, associated with Enlightened “individualism”, although in reality Enlightened thinkers 
would be quite shocked by our contemporary culture and values.  
Larry Wolff’s study should already act as a warning: (I know this may be shocking to some, 
but) the Enlightenment is perhaps not the best place to find inspiration for today’s problems. 
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One element here is certainly the enlightened predilection for simple dichotomies, such as the 
one between rational and irrational; pure and impure, secular and religious, public – private, 
…. Enlightenment thinkers indeed developed an abhorrence of hybridity or (in terms of the 
time) “mixing”. Their depreciate view of the Balkans and Eastern Europe in general was 
precisely based on this rejection of the mixing of peoples, languages and religions that 
characterized these regions, in alleged contrast to a more homogenous and ‘rational’ western 
Europe.  
A critical assessment of Wolff’s observations however reveals that this multicultarlism and 
mixing, either in Christian lands or the Ottoman Empire, apparently did not lead to sharp 
conflicts or violence, on the contrary. The popular association of particularly the Balkans with 
deep ethnic and religious oppositions and conflict that still pops up now and then in the public 
perception, actually dates from later. It largely dates from the mid 19th century when the 
Ottoman Empire crumbled and Ottomans resorted to (west-) European-style nationalist 
policies of state modernization, and particularly since the Balkan Wars.  
Also some other values that are usually associated with the Enlightenment and that are often 
referred to in contemporary debates (at least in Western Europe), are in reality ambiguous, 
such as religious toleration and the separation of church and state: Enlightened thinkers were 
not that tolerant in practice. In fact far more radical (progressive) views on tolerance and the 
separation of church and state had been formulated earlier in 16th c., for example by the 
French monk Eméric Crucé and by Roger Williams, founder of Rhode Island in (then) British 
America. These authors did not ground there claims for religious freedom and the separation 
between church and state on pure pragmatic or ‘rational’ arguments but on theological ones, 
on the “divine imperative” which demanded respect for the free will and rejected any form of 
coercion in religious matters (actually these to some extent also influenced Enlightened 
arguments, although that is hardly recognized in today’s perceptions either). Such arguments 
take religious differences serious. However, similar reasoning exist in all religious traditions, 
even in exclusive ones as Christianity and Islam. Arguably they hence may have more appeal 
than either secular arguments or lofty words about “we all celebrate the same god” ‒ which is 
blatantly not the case (after all quite some in our society do not recognize god at all). 
Why are these historical references important for today? 
1) Historical references abound in today’s rhetoric: I already referred to the uses of the 
Enlightenment, but also the Ottoman Empire is often invoked as a perpetual ‘other’ to the 
Christian West. In contrast to the popular perception that view is historically very dubious. 
2) A second reason why these historical references are important is that we are ‘victims’ of 
our past and certainly from our perceptions of it: it offers reference scheme for our 
contemporary policies, either when we believe in the historical myths or when we are not 
aware of it, as is often the case in contemporary ‘amnesiac’ societies, as inevitably we base 
our policies on implicit understandings of the past. 
3) History can be changed though: not what happened of course, but our representation of it. 
It hence can be used to develop different orientations (less victims of … if you engage 
critically). 
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4) History helps to explain why dealing with migrants and asylum seekers is difficult. 
There are of course economic and demographic factors that we should not underestimate, but 
I’d like to concentrate on cultural dimensions. Recent scholarship, of myself, Plilippe Buc and 
Michael Cook (among others) have argued that in contrast to our collective self-
representation, Europe values homogeneity over diversity and hence has always found it 
particularly difficult to cope with religious differences.  
(As I explain in my book Imagining European Unity Since 1000 AD) The reasons must be 
looked for deep in Europe’s history of Christendom. To a large extent, though not exactly 
in the same way, European Christendom and its secular successors share this attitude, the 
Enlightenment acting as some intellectual ‘go-between’ translating religious attitudes into 
secular practices.  
In this respect one could add that Europe and the Islamic word share similar attitudes, 
largely because they have similar strong and exclusive identities, which do not allow them to 
value of others or to organize a more harmonious society accommodating different faiths as 
some other religious or spiritual traditions can, such as premodern Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism. 
After WW II and when the significance of the Holocaust dawned, Western Europe 
slowly embarked on a different path epitomized in the slogan that the EU adopted in 2000 
(but it was around already since 1950) suggesting a positive appreciation of diversity. That 
was less the case in communist Europe. Some find here reasons to explain different attitudes, 
but they easily overlook that western Europe had become more homogenous than ever ‒ it is 
easy to applaud the virtues of diversity if everybody looks and thinks more or less the same.  
Still, since the 1960s Western Europe became considerably more diverse as a result from 
labour and postcolonial migrations. Religious tensions arose mainly in the 1990s though, 
when the economy resumed and frustrations among the left-behind grew, fueled by global 
developments which gave way to Islamic terrorism.  
Hence I am not sure finally that Eastern and Western Europe react that differently, though one 
has to go to look in more detail to different attitudes between East and West today. While the 
positions of Hungary and Poland seem to set the tone, I am not sure that they also represent 
this region, for example. The same set of tensions and oppositions can be observed throughout 
Europe, though the discourses may not be entirely identical. But in any case the current 
migration crisis clearly awakens old demons and raises particular challenges. The reactions in 
Britain after Brexit, where hate crimes against ‘foreigners’ increased dramatically, illustrate 
my point. 
What to do? There is no easy answer, and in any case it will imply serious problems. The 
strategy of isolation and exclusion, which is advocated by nationalists, quite some 
secularists and some religious movements, even if successful ‒ which I believe is impossible 
and counterproductive in the long run ‒ is self-delusionary as it will provoke a return to 
exclusive policies that have proven their destructive power all too well. The only way is a 
policy of inclusion, but this faces a tremendous challenge of convincing local populations 
that migrants are not necessarily a treat but an opportunity, even if there are serious risks 
which we should not neglect. 
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What role can religions play? Much depends on their position towards others: they may 
promote policies of exclusion and purity, as many have done in the past. If so, they are 
definitely part of the problem. The same applies for secularists, who sometimes use the 
present crisis to pursue secularist policies targeted against all religious expressions in the 
public. If, however they abandoned such policies, as most Christian churches and Islamic 
communities did in practice, they can play a major role both addressing migrants as ‒ 
perhaps most important ‒ the local population.   
Despite appearances and arguments of a certain candidate for the American presidency, I 
believe US and Canada give some clues about possible alternatives. 
In the US religion is seen as a resource, in Europe (esp. western Europe) it is viewed as a 
problem. Religion is a resource mainly as denominations ‒ not only Christian, but including 
Judaism, Islam, Hindu associations, etcetera ‒ give migrants a network, support, realize  
‘immersion’ in  US culture and society. It surely is not perfect, but I believe overall more 
effective than in Europe. 
In Europe ‒ certainly in Western Europe ‒ religions are treated with suspicion. History 
incidentally shows that this is even the case with migrants sharing the same faith as the host 
society, as Catholic Poles and Italians experienced in equally Catholic Belgium, for example. 
There is little difference in the way they were represented and treated in the 1950s and 
Muslims, either so-called “guest workers” or today’s refugees. 
Canada displays similar policies as in the US, but the country is certainly even more 
welcoming (albeit with conditions) and very strongly focused on maintaining original culture. 
That can be a hindrance as well, as migrants often want to fully integrate in the host country 
and are often more than willing to trade in on their culture of origin.  (in Quebec apparently 
less so: stronger emphasis on adaptation and integration/ assimilation) 
Both in (English-speaking) Canada and in the US migrants keep their own culture while at the 
same time integrating in society.  
The West-European system in contrast either amounts at isolation or requires a large degree 
of assimilation and particularly the acceptance of core values of the secular state and the 
alleged ‘Enlightenment culture’, as in France. This works fine for some, especially the 
cultural elites, but alienates and frustrates many others ‒ that many homegrown terrorists 
originate from France and Belgium is not entirely coincidence, though no system will avoid 
radicalization of some. 
The question is of course how accommodating a state, a society, can be towards religions 
values and practices that are at odds with those of the host society, either secular or religious.  
Wim Kymlicka and Amartya Sen have argued for the attribution of polyethnic rights to 
minorities allowing them to retain some cultural expressions while participating in civic life, 
including e.g. wearing headscarves in public schools. The identity pluralism that Sen 
promotes may offer a more promising road to pursue, as it avoids the primary of one identity 
over others (be it religious or ethnic) and hence also reduces the risk of isolation and 
radicalization, reconciling plurality rights with the need for integration. But the question how 
extensive these rights, which are also cultural exemptions, can be, remains a contentious 
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issue. Human rights to be sure must be the bottom line, though still the application remains 
subject of interpretation (what with polygamy? Circumcision?, Abortion?). Moreover, as 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn emphasized, we cannot enjoy all our rights without impeding of those 
of others. These problems however can be resolved, and should be, by concertation. It is 
obvious that religious institutions should have a prime role in these discussions. 
Here we are at the core of this conference theme: the dialogue of cultures. This brings me to 
my conclusion: the actual crisis is a tragedy, and leads to immense suffering. On top of that 
one risks bringing back Europe’s thanatic self-destructing nature. With the rise of the extreme 
right and populist anti-asylum movements here are clearly signs that this is happening. May 
be the churches and religious communities can help avoiding both dangers, if they step in and 
reach out to the refugees, showing the compassion, charity and humity that belongs to the core 
of every religion, and also appeal to the population as well as secular authorities to set up a 
much needed dialogue. What we need to avoid at all cost, is that communities, so called 
“home communities”, national minorities or migrants, established or new, become frustrated 
and isolated from mainstream society. That requires efforts from all sides. But frustration, 
more than economic deprivation, creates terrorists. Without dialogue, we are digging our own 
grave as much as that of others. 
Thank you. 
 
